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It is widely acknowledged that during the last decades of the twentieth century, the 
engagement of states with international human rights norms underwent a significant 
transformation.
3
 Evidence for this can be seen in states‟ involvement in the creation of new 
human rights institutions and international treaties. For example, with the entry into force of 
human rights instruments such as Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (in 1976)
4
 and the American Convention on Human Rights (in 1978),
5
 
participating nation states empowered human rights monitoring institutions to investigate 
individual complaints of state responsibility for human rights violations, even when the 
complaints were made by their own citizens. In addition, through the agreement of treaties 
such as the Convention against Torture,
6
 states created new transnational offences that state 
parties were obliged to prevent and punish. Furthermore, in addition to submitting themselves 
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to greater scrutiny on their adherence to human rights, states have also increasingly sought to 
promote human rights overseas through rule of law programmes,
7
 and cooperation with an 
ever-increasing range of international and hybrid criminal courts that hold individual 
perpetrators accountable for serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law.
8
 These 
forms of state behaviour were mirrored by an increased emphasis on human rights and the 
rule of law among international policymakers following the end of the Cold War.
9
 In a 
ground-breaking article in 2001, Lutz and Sikkink labelled these developments cumulatively 
as a „justice cascade‟.10 
In developing the „justice cascade‟ theory, Lutz and Sikkink relied primarily on 
developments in Latin America from the late 1970s to the late 1990s. They argued that during 
this period the region underwent „a rapid shift toward recognising the legitimacy of the 
human rights norms and an increase in international and regional action to effect compliance 
with these norms‟.11 Furthermore, pointing to the creation of the International Criminal Court 
in 1998 and increasing acceptance by domestic judges in several countries of the principle of 
universal jurisdiction for serious human rights violations, the authors argued that the justice 
cascade was „not limited to Latin America‟, but was also „reverberating internationally‟.12 
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These findings have been supported by other scholars who refer to the existence of 
„revolutions in accountability‟13 or an „age of accountability‟.14 
In relation to amnesty laws, the „justice cascade‟ theory appears to suggest that, as the 
relevant human rights norms spread around the world, fewer amnesty laws that violate these 
norms will be enacted and where pre-existing amnesty laws come into conflict with evolving 
norms, they will be eroded or annulled.
15
 However, the data collected to support the justice 
cascade focuses on the growth in trials to hold human rights violators to account.
16
 It does not 
document or explain the continued use of amnesty laws internationally that has been 
highlighted by this author and other scholars.
17
 Drawing on the data compiled by the author 
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in the Amnesty Law Database, this chapter will seek to address this gap by describing 
regional and global trends in amnesty law enactment and interpreting the existence of a 
global accountability norm in light of these trends. It will begin by discussing how „mapping‟ 
amnesty laws through a large-N, comparative study can contribute to transitional justice 
knowledge. It will then briefly outline how the concept of amnesties has been defined within 
the Amnesty Law Database, and the data categorisation and collection processes used to 
construct this database. In the following section, the findings from the database will be used 
to present an overview of regional and international trends in amnesty law enactment from 
1979 to 2011. This section will focus in particular on the period since the agreement of the 
Rome Statute in 1998,
18
 as this is often pointed to as a watershed event in the development of 
a global accountability norm. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to highlight trends in 
relation to all aspects of amnesty law scope and legal effects. Instead, it will focus on whether 
contemporary amnesties are more likely to exclude or include crimes under international law 
from their scope, which is a central issue to understandings of the „justice cascade‟. In the 
final section, the chapter will interpret the implications of these trends on the existence of 
such a cascade. 
WHY ‘MAP’ AMNESTY LAWS? 
Amnesty laws have played a central role in addressing political crises and violent conflicts 
for millennia.
19
 However, they have rarely been subjected to extensive comparative study. 
Instead, the literature has focused predominantly on in-depth studies of particular amnesty 
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processes,
20
 or since the 1990s, on the relationship between amnesty laws and states‟ duties to 
investigate and prosecute under international law.
21
 These studies have provided significant 
insights into how distinct forms of amnesties have operated in particular countries and on the 
parameters of the international legal framework relating to amnesties. However, they left 
considerable gaps in transitional justice knowledge on the causes, scope, legal effects and 
impact of amnesty laws. 
For example, as is common to transitional justice literature in general, the majority of 
in-depth country studies on amnesty laws focused on a handful of countries, notably 
Argentina and South Africa. As a result, these high-profile cases shaped much of the 
scholarly and practitioner debate on the nature of acceptable amnesties and on their impact on 
victims and societies. However, focusing on such single cases or small sets of cases can 
provide data with limited global applicability.
22
 For example, the amnesties in Argentina and 
South Africa were enacted following democratic elections, which creates different political 
dynamics and legitimacy than amnesties proclaimed in the midst of warfare. Furthermore, in 
both countries, even though the former regimes had severely corroded the rule of law, formal 
legal processes were nonetheless familiar to wide sections of population, whereas in other 
transitional contexts, traditional or community-based forms of justice may have greater 
                                                          
20
 See eg Jeremy Sarkin, Carrots and Sticks: The TRC and the South African Amnesty Process (Antwerp: 
Intersentia, 2004); Helena Cobban, Amnesty After Atrocity? Healing Nations After Genocide and War Crimes 
(Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2007). 
21
 See eg Andreas O‟Shea, Amnesty for Crime in International Law and Practice (Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2002); Faustin Z. Ntoubandi, Amnesty for Crimes Against Humanity Under International Law 
(Leiden: Brill, 2007). 
22
 Oskar N. T. Thoms, James Ron and Roland Paris, “State-Level Effects of Transitional Justice: What do we 
Know?” International Journal of Transitional Justice 4, no. 3 (2010): 329-354, 336. 
6 
 
resonance for many affected peoples.
23
 In addition, both Argentina and South Africa 
experienced distinctive forms of human rights violations in the policy of widespread enforced 
disappearances and the repressive apartheid regime. These experiences differ from the crimes 
committed in other transitional contexts. The focus on individual cases in the Americas and 
Sub-Saharan Africa has also meant that the literature has neglected the role of amnesties in 
other regions, notably Asia and the Middle East. This gap is particularly significant because, 
as will be discussed below, both regions currently have higher rates of new amnesty law 
enactment than the Americas. 
The gaps created by the relative absence of large-N comparative studies on the scope 
of amnesty laws are also problematic, as knowledge of trends in the scope of amnesty laws is 
crucial to understanding whether customary international law is evolving to prohibit certain 
forms of amnesty laws. In recent years, international jurists and scholars have increasingly 
made proclamations on the status of amnesty laws under customary international law, but few 
have based their assertions on extensive comparative studies of state practice.
24
 Indeed, by 
relying on a small number of cases, many of these analyses have overlooked the continued 
prevalence and endurance of amnesties around the world. 
Of the few large-N comparative studies of amnesty laws conducted to date, the first 
was a United Nations‟ report prepared by Louis Joinet in 1985. This influential report sought 
to „set out the practices followed by states dealing with amnesties‟, with the understanding 
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that such comparative research could contribute to „deducing a number of rules or constants 
which might serve as a framework for authorities proposing to initiate an amnesty, as well as 
to the jurists responsible for drafting legislation‟.25 The report further stated that „[t]his frame 
of reference might also be of use to the experts of the various specialised international 
supervisory bodies, in order to enable them to better assess the impact – positive, negative or 
nil – of an amnesty law‟ and for non-governmental organisations (NGOs).26 As explored 
below, this technical analysis of the nature on amnesty laws is similar to the approach 
pursued in the Amnesty Law Database as rather than treating amnesty laws as a homogenous 
group, it distils consideration of amnesty laws into distinct factors such as how and why 
amnesties are enacted, the crimes and categories of individuals covered, and the legal effects 
of amnesties. 
It is interesting to note that, although Lutz and Sikkink date the origins of the „justice 
cascade‟ to the early 1980s, when the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities commissioned the Joinet report in 1983, it stated that it had 
become aware of the importance that the promulgation of amnesty laws „could have for the 
safeguard and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms‟.27 In the final report, 
the positive role was described as including not just releasing all political prisoners,
28
 but also 
encouraging „national consensus in the wake of political change brought about in a 
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democratic framework‟; the „first act in the initiation of a democratic process‟; and blocking 
„an internal crisis‟ or marking „the end of an international armed conflict‟.29 
In the years following the Joinet report, amnesty laws became increasingly 
controversial and this contributed to the UN publicly changing its position on amnesties at the 
signing of the 1999 Lomé Accord which sought to end the conflict in Sierra Leone.
30
 Despite 
this growing controversy, no further large-N studies of amnesties were conducted until the 
mid-2000s, at which point, a few were launched by academics and conflict resolution 
practitioners. However, these studies only provided a partial picture of how amnesty laws are 
used around the world. For example, the comparative studies of peace agreements conducted 
by Bell
31
 and by Vinjamuri and Boesenecker
32
 highlight state practice in relation to amnesties 
only within peace agreements. In addition, neither these studies, nor the Transitional Justice 
Data Base Project, which compiles quantitative data on a range of transitional mechanisms 
enacted globally between 1970 and 2009, differentiate between different forms of amnesty 
laws.
33
 Instead, these projects adopt a universal operating definition of amnesties that can be 
applied across all contexts being investigated, but does not take into account the different 
forms of amnesty and the impact these differences can have on the law‟s impact in a 
transition. 
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As will be explored below, the Amnesty Law Database (ALD) can be distinguished 
from the other comparative studies on amnesties in relation to its research purposes and 
design. In particular, it was not developed with the aim of testing hypotheses regarding the 
causes or impacts of amnesty laws. Instead, it sought to address the gaps outlined above in 
transitional justice knowledge of amnesty laws by developing thicker descriptions of the 
forms that these laws take, where they are being enacted and their legal effects. In this way, 
the purpose of the ALD is primarily to „map‟ or to provide a descriptive foundation on which 
future evaluation and assessment of amnesty laws can be based. This mapping can provide 
data that is geographical in the sense that it reveals trends in amnesty law enactment within 
countries and across continents. However, it can also seek to describe the terrain and contours 
of amnesty laws themselves, in both their internal characteristics and external boundaries. To 
do this, as will be explored below, rather than treating amnesty laws as a homogenous group, 
the ALD breaks down individual amnesty laws into constituent elements, which are then 
classified and systematically analysed in order to identify patterns, correlations and anomalies 
in the different characteristics of these laws. As this chapter will explore below, this more 
fine-grained analysis is useful inter alia when determining whether amnesty laws are evolving 
in response to the justice cascade, as it reveals the extent to which contemporary amnesty 
laws grant or withhold amnesty for serious human rights violations. 
DEFINING AMNESTIES 
For all large-N comparative studies of amnesty laws, a central challenge is to define the 
concept of amnesty laws and then develop an operational definition of this concept. As has 
been noted for other transitional justice mechanisms,
34
 there is a lack of conceptual clarity on 
                                                          
34
 See eg Geoff Dancy et al, “The Turn to Truth: Trends in Truth Commission Experimentation,” Journal of 
Human Rights 9, no. 1 (2010): 45-64. 
10 
 
the nature of amnesty laws. This arises for several reasons. Firstly, within national legal 
systems, the term „amnesty‟ may be defined differently and different bodies may be 
empowered to grant amnesties.
35
 Secondly, as amnesty laws have traditionally fallen within 
the domain of state sovereignty, no accepted international definition has developed. As a 
result of these conditions, the scope and legal effects of amnesty laws around the world can 
look very different, ranging from amnesty laws that aim to provide a form of reparations to 
persons who have been arbitrarily detained by a repressive state to self-amnesty laws enacted 
by dictatorial rulers or war criminals eager to avoid penal sanctions. Indeed, Mark Freeman 
has suggested that „the difference between certain amnesties is so vast … that it is almost 
nonsensical to compare them‟.36 
Developing a clear definition of amnesty is further complicated as, although 
international law seeks to differentiate between amnesties and other leniency measures such 
as pardons and use immunity, domestic law can blur these distinctions. For example, the 
American Constitution empowers the President „to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses 
against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment‟,37 but makes no explicit reference 
to amnesties. However, in practice, the US Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to 
include the power to grant amnesties,
38
 and the Court has proclaimed that the president can 
exercise this power for both offenders who have been convicted and for persons who have yet 
to be investigated or stand trial.
39
 In addition, many amnesty laws seek to distinguish between 
categories of offenders with the result that one law may offer a range of different forms of 
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leniency, such as amnesty, probation and sentence reductions, which are allocated to distinct 
categories of offenders.
40
 
To accommodate these conceptual difficulties, the Amnesty Law Database has taken a 
broad, inclusive approach. Unlike quantitative databases, which before beginning to collect 
and code data, develop tightly defined and measureable definitions of amnesties that are 
drawn deductively from theoretical literature, the Amnesty Law Database takes a more 
inductive, grounded approach. As a result, a working definition was initially drawn from the 
theoretical and legal literature on amnesties, but during the process of data collection, this 
definition was developed and redefined in response to the identification of common features 
of amnesty laws. This process has resulted in the adoption of operational definition, which 
requires that in order to be included in the database, an amnesty process must be: 
 A de jure measure41 
 Enacted by state authorities42 through promulgated laws, peace agreements or executive 
policies
43
 
 Related to political offences (this can range from non-violent dissident activities to the 
perpetration of crimes under international law)
44
 
 Designed to remove criminal and/or civil sanctions – this primarily entails amnesties that 
apply pre-conviction, but post-conviction measures are included where (1) they are 
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granted in conjunction with pre-conviction amnesties; or (2) they eliminate not just the 
penalty, but also the criminal record for political prisoners 
 Formally implemented and/or taken advantage of by some of the targeted individuals 
As a result of this broad definition, within the Amnesty Law Database, there is great disparity 
in the types of amnesties included. However, as each of these amnesties is then broken down 
into distinct categories, this can enable researchers to develop more narrowly focused 
comparisons by, for example, looking only at amnesties granted for members of non-state 
armed groups or only at amnesties for crimes under international law. 
DATABASE DESIGN: TABLES AND VARIABLES 
As the Amnesty Law Database was intended primarily to describe amnesty processes, it was 
not created using spreadsheets or statistical software. Instead, the database was developed 
using relational tables in Microsoft Access as this facilitated the inclusion of extensive 
descriptive text, rather than coded data, although the database does nonetheless facilitate 
some limited counting to identify patterns. In the initial design phase, key issues relating to 
the causes, scope and legal effects of amnesty laws were identified from the theoretical 
literature, an initial survey of amnesty legislation and national and international case law. 
These issues included why and how the amnesty was introduced, what crimes it covered, who 
benefited from the amnesty, whether conditions were attached, what legal effects the amnesty 
had, how the amnesty was implemented, how it related to other transitional justice 
mechanisms, and how courts and other stakeholders responded to the amnesty process. The 
relational tables in the database correspond to these issues. 
After the relational tables had been identified, each of these issues was broken down 
into specific variables based deductively upon the international legal standards and on issues 
that arose from the secondary analyses of amnesties, and inductively from frequently 
13 
 
occurring elements within amnesty legislation. For example, the table relating to the crimes 
covered by the amnesty contained variables on whether crimes under international law, 
political crimes, economic crimes or other crimes against individuals were included or 
excluded from the amnesty.
45
 It also included variables on whether there were temporal or 
geographic restrictions relating to the commission of these crimes. For each of these 
variables, where appropriate, the database contains text detailing the scope of the amnesty 
law drawn from the law itself and other sources. Only a small sample of this data will be 
explored here, as the majority of the variables are beyond the scope of this chapter. 
Once the data has been compiled for a number of amnesty processes, the database is 
used to identify patterns by running queries to view the total number of amnesties with data 
for a particular variable, to examine patterns for a particular variable over time or across 
regions, and to identify relationships between different variables, such as whether amnesties 
for crimes under international law are more likely to be granted to non-state actors. In 
addition, by entering the descriptive text, rather than numerical codes for each variable, the 
exact provision of the amnesty law can be easily retrieved. 
DATA COLLECTION: CONTEXTS, SCOPE AND SOURCES 
Following the model outlined in the 1985 Joinet report, the Amnesty Law Database does not 
restrict itself solely to amnesties enacted during political transitions, but rather gathers data 
on amnesties emanating from all forms of political crises including civil unrest, military 
coups, international or internal conflict, authoritarian government, or states that are 
transitioning from such crises. Pursuing this broader approach is significant for several 
reasons. Firstly, it includes analyses of amnesty laws introduced in contexts where crimes 
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under international law may not have been committed, or where the amnesty laws are 
designed to remedy human rights violations, such as arbitrary detention or forced 
displacement, rather than promote impunity. By including these forms of amnesties, the 
research can cast light on how amnesty laws can be used in ways which do not conflict with 
international law. Secondly, in many transitional contexts, questions of whether international 
crimes were committed are often highly contested. For example, in Northern Ireland during 
the Troubles, the British government resisted efforts to characterise the violence as a conflict, 
which would fall under the international humanitarian law framework, and instead preferred 
to apply domestic criminal law. By extending the scope of the database beyond situations in 
which international crimes have been widely recognised to have been committed, the 
Amnesty Law Database can incorporate such contested contexts. Thirdly, by including 
amnesty laws introduced in „pre-transition‟ periods, the database can capture information on 
amnesties that are used as counter-insurgency tools or to facilitate peace negotiations. 
Although such contexts are not strictly speaking „transitions‟, where amnesties are granted 
prior to a transition, they can influence the choice of transitional justice policies adopted by 
constraining the extent of accountability that can be pursued. 
Although political amnesties have been used for millennia, the temporal scope of the 
Amnesty Law Database is restricted to amnesties that were introduced after the end of the 
Second World War. This cut-off date was selected as it was from 1945 that international 
human rights law and international criminal law began to develop. For amnesties occurring 
after this date, the database, rather than sampling, includes all amnesty laws that meet the 
operational definition outlined above.
46
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In compiling data on individual amnesty processes, a range of documentary sources 
were employed including domestic legislation; international treaties and peace agreements; 
scholarly writings; jurisprudence from national and international courts and opinions given by 
treaty-monitoring bodies; statements and reports by intergovernmental organisations 
(particularly the UN institutions); reports by states (particularly Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices from the US Department of State); reports by NGOs (particularly Amnesty 
International, Human Rights Watch and International Crisis Group); and newspaper articles.
47
 
Challenges to data collection were similar to those faced by other comparative social science 
scholars, and included language difficulties, the time that had elapsed since the amnesty was 
introduced, the lack of transparency in the state concerned, bias within the available sources, 
or a relative lack of academic research on the relevant transitional state. To try to combat 
these problems, as well as often obfuscatory language within amnesty laws, efforts were 
made to base the description of each amnesty on as wide a variety of sources as possible.  
At the time of writing, the Amnesty Law Database contains information on 537 
amnesty laws in 129 countries that were introduced between 1945 and June 2011. As the start 
of the justice cascade or the global accountability norm is commonly dated to the late 1970s, 
this chapter will limit its analysis to amnesties introduced between 1979 and 2011. This 
means that global and regional trends will be explored for a total of 398 amnesties laws 
enacted in 115 countries. 
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GLOBAL AND REGIONAL TRENDS IN AMNESTY ADOPTION, 1979-2011 
With the expansion of international criminal law and transitional justice, scholars and 
practitioners have frequently proclaimed „the impending demise of amnesty‟.48 This section 
will explore whether these assertions are premature by analysing global and regional trends in 
amnesty adoption over the past thirty years. In particular, it will assess whether the growth of 
the „justice cascade‟ has contributed to a fall in the number of amnesty laws enacted for 
crimes under international law. 
Amnesty Trends by Year 
In the midst of the Cold War, many countries experienced dictatorship or conflict. For 
example, according to Freedom House, 41 per cent of the world‟s countries were „not free‟ 
and a further 31 per cent were only „partially free‟ in 1978.49 In addition, the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program has found that the number of active conflicts around the world 
increased during the 1970s.
50
 As a result of these dynamics, the number of amnesty laws also 
increased sharply during that decade.
51
 As the focus of this chapter is on the period from 
1979, the global trend in the enactment of political amnesties in each of the following years is 
shown in Figure 1: 
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Figure 1: Global number of amnesties enacted by year (1979-2010). 
Between January 1979 and December 2010, an average of 12.25 amnesty laws were enacted 
each year, and between January to June 2011 a further six amnesties have been introduced. 
However, as Figure 1 illustrates, between 1979 and 2010, the global rate of amnesty law 
enactment went through a number of peaks and troughs. For example, following the end of 
the Cold War in 1989, the number of amnesty laws rose sharply. This increase can be 
attributed to firstly, the political transitions that took place in the former communist states in 
Eastern Europe, which resulted in a series of amnesty laws, predominantly to benefit 
dissidents whose actions had been criminalised by the former regimes. The end of the Cold 
War also meant that the superpowers stopped propping up dictatorial regimes or intervening 
in civil wars to prolong the violence. The end of these interventions meant that many 
countries moved towards negotiated peace agreements or pacted transitions that often 
included amnesties. Conversely, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia 
caused some newly independent states to spiral into civil war as ethnic tensions that had 
previously been suppressed came to the fore. These conflicts contributed to a series of 
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amnesties in the late 1990s. The impact of the end of the Cold War on amnesty rates has been 
noted by other comparative studies. For example, in 2005 Binningsbø et al wrote that „the 
probability of amnesty after the Cold War is … higher than the probability that a conflict was 
followed by amnesty in the decades after the Second World War‟.52 Although the frequency 
with which amnesties were enacted varied considerably during these three decades, the global 
trend, as shown by the dotted line, indicates that the rate of amnesty laws introduced has 
remained constant. This trend has also been found by Olsen et al, who argue that their 
Transitional Justice Data Base illustrates „a steady persistence of amnesties‟.53 Similarly, 
Mark Freeman has argued that „amnesties are as prevalent today as at any time in modern 
history … we are no more at the end of amnesties than we are at the “end of history”‟.54 
The past decade has seen many developments in international criminal law, including 
the creation of the ICC, universal jurisdiction proceedings for human rights violations in 
several countries, and the UN‟s decision from 1999 to refrain from recognising amnesty laws 
for serious crimes under international law. The expectation among human rights campaigners 
has been that these developments would make amnesty laws less attractive for perpetrators 
and would gradually lead to a reduction in their use. To explore whether such a decline has 
begun to develop, Figure 2 isolates global trends in amnesty enactment from 1 January 1999: 
                                                          
52
 Helga Malmin Binningsbø et al, “Civil War and Transitional Justice, 1946-2003: A Dataset” (paper prepared 
for presentation at the „Transitional Justice and Civil War Settlements‟ workshop in Bogotá, Colombia 18-19 
October 2005) 17-18. 
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 Olsen, Payne and Reiter, Transitional Justice in Balance. 
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Figure 2: Global amnesty enactment trends, January 1999 – December 2010. 
From January 1999 to December 2010, an average of 12.5 amnesty laws were enacted 
annually, but as with the longer time period, Figure 2 indicates that over the past decade there 
has been considerable variation in the total number of amnesties introduced each year. For 
example, in 2003, the year following the creation of the ICC, the number of amnesty laws 
enacted was almost double the average annual enactment rate, and amounted to the largest 
annual total to have been enacted in any year. During 2003, amnesty laws were enacted in 
every region of the world, although to differing frequencies,
55
 and in diverse political 
contexts.
56
 In contrast to 2003, in 2009 only half the annual average of new amnesty laws 
were enacted. Overall, however, although the average number of amnesty laws enacted 
annually since 1999 is slightly higher than for 1979-2010, the global trend as illustrated by 
the dotted lines indicates a fall in the rate of amnesty enactment since 1999. As the rate of 
amnesty law enactment frequently goes through sizeable peaks and troughs, it is too early to 
                                                          
55
 Eg over a third of the total was enacted within Sub-Saharan Africa, whereas only one was enacted in the 
Americas. 
56
 Eg 35 per cent emanating from repressive regimes and 43 per cent from ongoing conflicts or transitions from 
conflict. 
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determine whether this reflects an emerging trend in state practice, or whether it is just a 
temporary fall in the numbers. Indeed, from January 2010, the number of amnesty laws being 
introduced seems to be climbing again, a change which in 2011 can be partially attributed to 
the amnesties proclaimed in the „Arab Spring‟. It seems therefore that caution is warranted 
when looking at these contemporary trends, particularly since the rates of change have not 
occurred uniformly across all regions. 
Amnesty Laws by Region 
Within the Amnesty Law Database, countries are allocated to one of the five following 
regions: Americas, Asia, Europe and Central Asia, Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-
Saharan Africa. As shown in Figure 3, amnesties were enacted in all regions of the world 
since 1979: 
 
Figure 3: Amnesty laws by region, 1979-2010. 
It is perhaps unsurprising that the greatest proportion of amnesty laws enacted from 1979 to 
2010 was introduced in Sub-Saharan Africa (33 per cent) due to that region‟s large number of 
21 
 
states and high incidence of conflict.
57
 However, it is quite striking that there is very little 
difference between the proportions of amnesty laws enacted in the Americas (16 per cent), 
Asia (18 per cent) and Europe and Central Asia (19 per cent) during this period. This is 
particularly remarkable, as Europe and the Americas have more developed regional human 
rights monitoring mechanisms than Asia. However, among these regions there are 
considerable variations over time, as shown in Figure 4: 
 
Figure 4: Regional trends by year, 1979-2011. 
By looking at the regional trends over time, some interesting patterns emerge. For example, 
during the 1980s, the Americas had the highest rate of amnesty law enactment, which can be 
attributed to the military dictatorships and civil wars that occurred in the region during this 
decade. However, the region‟s rate of amnesty enactment declined sharply from the mid-
1990s from which point it has had the lowest rate of new amnesty laws being introduced 
(although most of its pre-existing amnesty laws have remained in effect). The overall trend 
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for the Americas between 1979 and 2010 is one of declining numbers of new amnesty laws. 
This finding reflects the changing political conditions in the region since the late 1980s, 
particularly the establishment of democratic government in many countries.
58
 The rate of 
amnesty law enactment in the Middle East and North Africa remained constant. However, 
four amnesties have been introduced in this region between January and June 2011, which 
could mark the start of a change in this trend, particularly since the rate of amnesties in this 
region has historically been low.
59
 In contrast, the amnesty trends for the remaining three 
regions showed an increased reliance on new amnesties between 1979 and 2010. The sharpest 
increase in the rate of amnesty law enactment occurred in Asia, although the numbers of new 
amnesties in this region remain less than in Sub-Saharan Africa. If the regional trends are 
analysed for the years from 1999 to 2010, unsurprisingly given the global trends for the 
decade, an increasing number of regions have witnessed declining amnesty law enactment 
rates. Asia remains the only region where the rate of new amnesty law enactment has 
remained constant, whilst Europe and Central Asia has witnessed the steepest decline. The 
constant rate in Asia could perhaps reflect that during the past decade, this region has had the 
highest rates of ongoing conflict.
60
 The impact of the different political crises on the rates of 
amnesty law introduction will be explored below. 
Amnesty Laws by Political Crises 
As noted above, the Amnesty Law Database compiles data on amnesty laws introduced in 
response to a range of political crises. Within the database, these crises have been broken 
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down into seven fields:
61
 conflicted democracy,
62
 coup attempt, ongoing conflict, ongoing 
repression, transition from dictatorship, transition from internal conflict, and transition from 
international conflict.
63
 The distribution for each of these transition types for the years from 
1979-2011 can be seen in Figure 5: 
 
Figure 5: Amnesty laws by transition type, 1979-2011. 
                                                          
61
 There is overlap between some of these categories, for example, a country could be in transition from 
dictatorship, but the military could still exercise considerable influence resulting in some policies of repression. 
Furthermore, distinguishing between internal and international conflicts can be problematic. In addition, these 
categorisations simplify what in many states could be multiple transitions, for example, both from conflict to 
peace, but also from authoritarian rule to democracy. Finally, the transitions are classified according to the 
moment when the amnesty was introduced. For example, the term “transition from conflict” is used if elections 
have been held or peace agreement signed, even where violence later reignites. 
62
 Within this study, conflicted democracy denotes various contexts including widespread anti-government 
protests, violence erupting from elections, or terrorist violence within democratic states. See Fionnuala Ní 
Aoláin and Colm Campbell, “The Paradox of Transition in Conflicted Democracies,” Human Rights Quarterly 
27, no. 1 (2005): 172-213. 
63
 As noted above, this is a much broader range of contexts than are included in other datasets on amnesty laws, 
that focus solely on amnesties enacted as part of a transition or negotiated peace agreements. 
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This chart illustrates that over the past thirty years almost half of all amnesties enacted were 
related to conflicts, either when the conflict was ongoing or during peace negotiations. If the 
data is restricted to the years from 1999 to 2011, the proportion of amnesties related to 
conflict rises to slightly over 50 per cent. As noted above, the relationship of amnesties to 
conflict resolution has been explored in comparative large-N studies on peace agreements, 
which have found that peace accords are more likely to include amnesty laws than other 
forms of transitional justice. For example, in a survey of peace agreements made between 
1980 and 2006, Vinjamuri and Boesenecker found that whilst „provisions for prosecutions 
and truth commissions are rare in peace agreements, … the use of amnesty is comparatively 
common‟.64 They further found that the rates of amnesties in the agreements remained 
„relatively stable over the time period analysed‟,65 even though from 2000, the number of 
peace agreements concluded declined.
66
 Among the amnesty provisions identified by 
Vinjamuri and Boesenecker, they found that 21 per cent of the agreements contained „no 
justice mechanism, amnesty provision, or IHL/HR law reference whatsoever‟.67 This finding 
has been interpreted by the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue as illustrating that 
the most active proponents and perpetrators of war are relatively unchallenged 
by law in most peace agreements. When justice mechanisms are adopted, the 
overwhelming trend is towards strategies of co-existence, forgiveness and 
reconciliation instead of legal accountability.
68
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 Vinjamuri and Boesenecker, Accountability and Peace Agreements 5. 
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 Ibid. 9. 
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 Ibid. 13. 
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 Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, „Charting the roads to peace: Facts, figures and trends in conflict 
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The prevalence of amnesty laws in peace agreements is perhaps a reflection that within much 
of the literature, amnesties introduced to bring mass violence to an end are viewed as more 
acceptable than self-amnesties introduced by dictatorial rulers or amnesties enacted by 
democratic politicians some time after a transfer of power. The role of amnesty in facilitating 
the peaceful resolution of violent conflict has been recognised by states parties to the 
Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions. This is the only treaty to mention amnesty 
laws explicitly and it encourages states parties to enact the „broadest possible amnesty to 
persons who have participated‟ in non-international armed conflicts.69 
In addition to conflict-related amnesties, 40 per cent of amnesties resulted from 
dictatorial rule, either introduced by the repressive regime itself (38 per cent) or by its 
successors (8 per cent). As noted above, the number of repressive regimes in the world has 
declined since 1979 and consequently the number of amnesties that result from such contexts 
has declined over the past three decades. 
If these global trends on political crisis are analysed by region considerable 
divergences are apparent, as illustrated in Figure 6: 
                                                          
69
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Figure 6: Regional trends by political crisis, 1979-2011. 
This chart illustrates that, during the past thirty years, amnesties resulting from ongoing 
conflicts featured most heavily in Sub-Saharan Africa, followed by Asia and the Americas. If 
the data is analysed just for the past decade, ongoing conflicts remain a significant factor in 
both Africa and Asia, and in particular, amnesties as part of transitions from internal conflict 
are most prevalent in Sub-Saharan Africa. In contrast, since 1979 amnesties relating to 
dictatorial regimes were introduced most often in the Middle East and North Africa. Despite 
the differences in the type of political crisis that can trigger the enactment of amnesty laws, in 
many of these contexts, serious human rights violations were committed by both government 
forces and non-state actors. 
Amnesties and Crimes under International Law 
Unlike other datasets that focus only on amnesty laws for human rights abuses, as noted 
above, the Amnesty Law Database includes amnesties enacted for a wide range of political 
offences. As a result, serious human abuses are not a factor for all amnesties in the Amnesty 
Law Database. Furthermore, due to the differences in states‟ ratifications of human rights 
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treaties and the existence of human rights institutions in different regions, the Amnesty Law 
Database does not focus on gathering data on human rights abuses broadly defined. Instead, it 
isolates only amnesties for international crimes, namely, genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, disappearances and torture. Where the text of amnesty laws does not explicitly 
state which crimes are included or excluded in an amnesty, determining whether international 
crimes are a factor is problematic, particularly when states for political reasons decline to 
acknowledge the inclusion of international crimes in the amnesty legislation, preferring 
instead to frame them as domestic crimes. In addition, some individual amnesty processes 
both include and exclude crimes under international law, by for example, excluding crimes 
against humanity from the amnesty, but allowing torturers to escape prosecution. In 
constructing the Amnesty Law Database, the author has taken a cautious approach and 
entered data relating to international crimes only when (1) the following crimes were 
explicitly mentioned in the text of the amnesty: war crimes, genocide, crimes against 
humanity, torture and disappearances; (2) when case law indicated that the amnesty included 
or excluded these crimes; and/or (3) when there is substantial evidence in reports by UN or 
regional human rights institutions or by respected human rights organisations, such as 
Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch, that crimes under international law were 
perpetrated. As a result, it is probable that the Amnesty Law Database under-represents the 
number of amnesty processes which grant impunity for crimes under international law. 
Nonetheless, Figure 7 illustrates trends in the relationship between amnesties and 
international crimes: 
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Figure 7: Trends in amnesties and international crimes by year, 1979-2010. 
The trends illustrated in Figure 7 relate only to amnesty laws in which it has been clearly 
identified that crimes under international law have been included or excluded. When the 
patterns are looked at over the past thirty years, it becomes apparent that both approaches 
have been a feature of amnesty laws around the world. The rates of amnesties including 
crimes under international law has increased over the past thirty years, but for most years 
since the early 1990s, more amnesties have excluded crimes under international law. 
However, it is interesting to note that after a peak around 1999, the number of amnesties 
explicitly excluding crimes under international law has fallen. 
The past decade is perhaps the most significant period in the relationship between 
crimes under international law and amnesties due to the creation of the ICC and the change in 
the UN‟s stance towards amnesties for serious human rights violations. The yearly trends for 
this decade are illustrated in Figure 8: 
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Figure 8: Trends in amnesties and international crimes, 1999-2010. 
This chart shows that, as the rate of amnesty law enactment has fallen since 1999, the number 
of amnesties both including and excluding crimes under international law has also fallen. 
However, where states still chose to enact amnesty laws, this chart indicates that states are 
only slightly more likely to exclude serious human rights violations from the amnesty law 
than to include them. 
During the period 1979-2010, there were regional differences in approaches to 
granting amnesties for crimes under international law as illustrated in Figure 9: 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Included
Excluded
30 
 
 
Figure 9: Amnesties and international crimes by region, 1979-2011. 
From Figure 9, we can see that the only regions where the number of amnesties excluding 
crimes under international law exceeded the number of amnesties that included such crimes 
are Europe and Central Asia, and the Middle East and North Africa. In all other regions 
during the past thirty years, states have been more likely to amnesty crimes under 
international law than to exclude them. These trends have changed during the past decade, 
particularly in relation to the Americas, as shown in Figure 10: 
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Figure 10: Amnesties and international crimes by region, 1999-2010. 
From this chart, we can see that Europe and Central Asia is now the region least likely to 
grant new amnesties for crimes under international law. Furthermore, in all regions of the 
world in the past decade, the newly enacted amnesty laws have been more likely to exclude 
crimes under international law than to include them. However, in Asia and Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the likelihood is less pronounced. 
This section has illustrated a range of trends relating to when, where and in what 
context, new amnesty laws have been enacted, and the extent to which these laws apply to 
crimes under international law. The implications of these global and regional trends for the 
theory of the justice cascade will be explored below. 
AMNESTY TRENDS AND THE GLOBAL ACCOUNTABILITY NORM 
The emergence of a global accountability norm under which prosecutions would replace 
impunity as the presumptive response to atrocity has been subject to extensive debate among 
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scholars, jurists and human rights activists.
70
 Proponents of this norm highlight multiple 
„norm-affirming events‟71 to support its existence. These events include the enactment of 
international conventions such as the Rome Statute 1998, the judgments of international and 
hybrid tribunals on customary international law relating to international crimes, the speeches 
of officials of national governments and intergovernmental bodies acknowledging the norm, 
and the enactment of domestic legislation.
72
 Since the end of the Cold War, there is ample 
evidence of these types of events supporting the development of a global accountability 
norm. However, as the data in the previous section indicates, amnesty laws continue to be 
enacted by states facing political crises. This suggests that the global accountability norm has 
not yet reached the point where it has „become so widely accepted‟ that it is „internalized by 
actors‟ and has achieved „a “taken-for granted” quality that makes conformance with [it] 
almost automatic‟.73 Nonetheless, its emergence may be impacting upon amnesty trends. 
When global trends in amnesty law enactment were analysed for the years from 1979 
to 2011, the data indicated that the rate of amnesty laws had remained steady throughout the 
period despite developments in accountability. At face value, these findings appear to 
undermine the existence of a „justice cascade‟ in which according to Sunstein „societies are 
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presented with rapid shifts towards new norms‟.74 However, as the author has argued 
elsewhere,
75
 the sharp increase in the rate of amnesty laws during the 1970s and their 
endurance over the past thirty years may indicate a move away from lawlessness and „de 
facto‟ impunity, where states simply failed to prosecute, towards an increasingly legalistic 
approach, in which states use law, in the form of amnesty legislation, to address legacies of 
past crimes. Arguably, these changes could indicate increasing recognition of international 
legal obligations relating to the duty to investigate and prosecute, both among human rights 
abusers causing them to seek amnesties, and among transitional governments. If this is the 
case, it would then be expected to eventually cause a decline in the number of amnesty laws. 
When the global trends in amnesty introduction were analysed just for the past 
decade, this research found that, in contrast to the longer time period, the rate of amnesty 
laws has in fact decreased. In addition, where amnesty laws are proposed or enacted today 
there are often met by „social disapproval‟ from international civil society,76 
intergovernmental human rights bodies,
77
 and even from governments of other states.
78
 This 
disapproval can be expressed in written or oral statements, or in some cases by threats to 
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withhold support for transitional justice projects. For example, the UN refused to cooperate 
with the Commission for Truth and Friendship that was jointly established by Indonesia and 
Timor Leste as the commission was empowered to „recommend amnesty for those involved 
in human rights violations who cooperate fully in revealing the truth‟.79 Sunstein has argued 
that the production of social disapproval indicates that a „tipping point‟ has been reached, and 
that the costs of expressing new norms have become lower than adherence to the old norm.
80
 
There are, however, several reasons to be cautious in pronouncing that the global 
accountability norm‟s „tipping point‟ has arrived. 
Firstly, although the rate of amnesty laws has declined in last decade, this is due 
primarily to a drop in the number of amnesty laws in 2008 and 2009. If only the years from 
1999 to 2007 are considered the decline does not appear to be pronounced. In addition, the 
increase in the number of amnesty laws enacted between January 2010 and June 2011 
suggests that the recent decline was an anomaly rather than a sustained trend. Overall, the 
data reveals that amnesty laws continue to be enacted by states facing political crises, and as 
a result, it is too early to determine whether the decline in the rate of amnesty law enactment 
over the past decade represents a lasting change in norm adherence among states. 
Secondly, as the global accountability norm should encourage an increase in support 
for trials for serious violations of human rights, its existence would be expected to result in 
these crimes increasingly being excluded from amnesty legislation. As the data above 
indicated, since 1979 the rate of amnesty laws excluding these crimes has indeed increased, 
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but so too has the rate of amnesties including serious human rights violations. Overall, there 
is little difference between the rates for including or excluding these crimes. 
Thirdly, social disapproval of amnesty laws expressed by governments and 
intergovernmental bodies does not represent condemnation of all forms of amnesty in 
political transitions. For example, amnesty laws for political prisoners or to facilitate the 
return of refugees still have strong international support.
81
 Social disapproval is triggered 
primarily in relation to amnesties for serious human rights violations. However, even this 
disapproval is rarely consistent. For example, some transitional states, such as Kenya and 
Nepal have been subject to substantial international pressure to investigate and prosecute, 
whereas amnesties enacted in other states have been largely overlooked even where they 
were granted for serious crimes.
82
 Furthermore, donor states that admonish developing 
countries for proposing amnesty legislation for serious human rights violations generally do 
so without applying the same condemnation to their own pre-existing amnesty legislation.
83
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In recent years, there have also been cases of strong international support for amnesty 
processes. For example, during the final stages of the conflict between the Tamil Tigers and 
the Sri Lankan government in 2009, international actors made statements endorsing an 
amnesty for surrendering insurgents.
84
 These statements of support did not refer to the need 
to prosecute serious human rights violations that had been committed during the conflict. In 
addition to statements of support, some amnesty processes receive financial backing. For 
example, the Ugandan Amnesty Act 2000, which grants amnesty for all conflict-related 
crimes committed by insurgents fighting against the government, including the atrocities 
committed by the Lord‟s Resistance Army, has consistently received financial support from 
international donors for its implementation.
85
 These endorsements of amnesties for serious 
crimes appear not to have been motivated by a desire for impunity, but rather a recognition of 
the role that amnesty can play in encouraging combatants to surrender and disarm. 
Fourthly, states have consistently failed to prohibit amnesty laws in international 
conventions. For example, during the Rome Conference delegates debated a range of 
proposals relating to amnesty laws, but were ultimately unable to reach a consensus on 
prohibiting them in the ICC Statute. As a result, the Statute contains no reference to amnesty 
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legislation.
86
 Indeed, to date, the only convention to discuss amnesty laws explicitly is 
Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, which in Article 6(5) encourages states 
parties to enact the „broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated‟ in non-
international armed conflicts.
87
 The Commentary on the Additional Protocol asserts that this 
provision is „to encourage gestures of reconciliation which can contribute to re-establishing 
normal relations in the life of a nation which has been divided‟.88 
Finally, where there is international pressure in favour of prosecutions, it can result in 
serious human rights violations being excluded from the scope of amnesty legislation, but this 
does not automatically mean that these crimes will be prosecuted. In addition, even where a 
prosecution policy is adopted, it is generally restricted to trials of relatively small numbers of 
high-ranking or notorious offenders, whilst the middle and lower-ranking offenders and their 
supporters escape legal accountability. This phenomenon was acknowledged by the UN 
Secretary General in 2004 when he noted, „[i]n the end, in post-conflict countries, the vast 
majority of perpetrators of serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian 
law will never be tried, whether internationally or domestically.‟89 The failure to prosecute 
could be due to multiple factors including a lack of evidence, of judicial and penal capacity, 
limited financial resources, the ongoing political and military strength of the offenders, or a 
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decision by the government to prioritise other policies, such as development and security, 
over the pursuit of justice. Governments facing these conditions may wish to prosecute past 
crimes and therefore decide to exclude international crimes from amnesty legislation to 
ensure that trials may be possible in the future, where they cannot be held immediately. 
However, other states may exclude international crimes from amnesty legislation to conform 
to international pressure, rather than in acceptance of a global accountability norm. This 
rhetorical adherence to the norm can be particularly apparent where exclusions for 
international crimes are not enforced during the implementation of amnesty legislation.
90
 
The existence of a norm is not dependent on individuals or countries consistently 
adhering to it. Indeed, Lutz and Sikkink argue that „[j]ustifying norm breaking may … be a 
norm-affirming event, if in making the justification, the actor recognizes the existence of the 
norm and explains why it was not possible to abide by the norm in particular 
circumstances‟.91 However, where states enact amnesty laws for serious human rights 
violations today, they rarely acknowledge the existence of a global accountability norm. 
Instead, they argue that the amnesty is necessary to bring peace and promote reconciliation. 
These rationales are often echoed by international actors who support and fund amnesty 
processes. This therefore casts doubt on the extent to which a global accountability norm has 
emerged. 
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As the data above illustrates there are regional divergences in amnesty trends. In 
particular, the Americas region has undergone the steepest decline in the rate of amnesty law 
enactment and during the last decade, fewer amnesty laws were enacted in this region than 
elsewhere in the world. In addition, unlike amnesty laws enacted in the Americas during the 
1970s and 1980s, amnesties in this region are now less likely to include serious human rights 
violations than to exclude them.
92
 This data supports the conclusion that a „justice cascade‟ 
has developed in this region. Lutz and Sikkink have suggested that this may be due to the 
region‟s „tradition of commitment to international law and human rights norms‟. They further 
argued that „[b]ecause of this preexisting, well-established normative framework, 
international enforcement pressures resonated domestically as external pressures reinforced 
domestic values‟.93 The data presented above also indicates that similar trends have been 
taking place in Europe and Central Asia, due to the ongoing conflicts and political repression 
in the Newly Independent States and the Caucasus region of Russia, these trends are not yet 
as pronounced as in the Americas. In contrast, the existence of a „justice cascade‟ is less 
pronounced in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, as in these regions the rate of amnesty laws has 
remained high and many of the amnesty laws enacted grant immunity to perpetrators of 
crimes under international law. 
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CONCLUSION 
Support for a global accountability norm among human rights activists and scholars has 
caused amnesty laws for serious human rights violations to become increasingly controversial 
in recent decades. However, much of the support for this norm has focused on the surge in 
the number of prosecutions for perpetrators of mass atrocity, but has failed to take into 
account global and regional trends in amnesty law enactment. Indeed, as this chapter has 
argued, until recent years, there have been surprisingly few large-N comparative studies of 
amnesty laws. Where these trends are explored using the Amnesty Law Database, they 
indicate that over the past thirty years amnesty law enactment has continued at a steady rate. 
In addition, throughout this period, although the number of new amnesty laws excluding 
international crimes has increased, so too has the number of amnesties including such crimes. 
This chapter has argued that these trends cast doubt on the existence of the global 
accountability norm, particularly where the enactment of amnesty laws receives diplomatic 
and financial support from international organisations and donor states. Although such 
support has yet to be systematically documented, it seems that it is particularly forthcoming 
where the amnesty is enacted in the midst of ongoing conflict to encourage combatants to 
surrender and disarm. This suggests that despite the development of international criminal 
law and transitional justice, a belief persists within states and the international community 
that in times of extreme violence, amnesty may be a necessary compromise to achieve peace. 
